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It’s Elementary
A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger
June 2005

The Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief
High local property taxes are a source of frustration for voters in many states. Moreover, the
combination of high school property taxes and wide variation in district wealth per pupil is a major
source of existing disparities in educational funding. Not surprisingly, therefore, many elected officials
have supported property tax relief, not only as a way to gain political favor for cutting taxes but also as a
way to add balance to the state’s revenue system and to reform educational finance. The trouble is that
property tax relief programs often have significant unintended consequences.

New York State provides an ideal case study. In 1997, New York passed the School Tax Relief
Program, STAR, which became fully effective in 2001. STAR exempts from school property taxes a
certain amount of a house’s value. The basic STAR exemption, $30,000, is available to all homeowners,
whereas an enhanced STAR exemption, $50,000, is available only for elderly homeowners with annual
incomes below $60,000. Consider a house worth $100,000 in a school district with a 1.5 percent
property tax rate. Without STAR, a nonelderly owner of this house pays a property tax of
(.015)´($100,000) = $1,500, but with STAR, this owner’s tax drops to (.015)´($100,000 - $30,000) =
$1,050, a reduction of $450, or 30 percent.

STAR has two other key provisions: renters receive no exemption, and STAR exemptions are adjusted
upward by a “sales price differential factor” in counties with a median house sales price above the state
average. New York State funds STAR; that is, each school district is compensated by the state for the
revenue it loses because of the STAR exemptions. Thus, STAR acts as a type of state aid. Because of
their high renter populations, all the large cities in New York except Yonkers receive relatively little
benefit from STAR. In contrast, the wealthy suburbs of New York City receive relatively large benefits
because of their high homeownership rates and their high house values. In 2001-2002, the STAR
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program provided property tax relief per pupil ranging from $320 in New York City and $564 in the
upstate big cities to $1,395 in the wealthy downstate suburbs.

The most serious problem with STAR is that rental and sales-price provisions result in an unfair
distribution of tax relief. Despite the funding needs of the large cities, which are highlighted by the CFE
case (discussed in several previous columns), STAR distributes roughly $3 billion dollars in a manner
that is heavily skewed toward low-need districts. STAR also has had some fairly dramatic unintended
consequences, namely, that it has led to increased spending and increased property tax rates in school
districts throughout the state. The rate increases offset some of the original STAR tax savings for
homeowners, and they boost the tax burden on commercial and industrial property. The higher spending
has boosted educational performance, but because STAR ignores student needs, and rewards wealthy
counties, it has not led to more equity in educational spending or outcomes.

The mechanism behind these changes is straightforward. By exempting a share of residential property
from taxation, STAR lowers the “price” a voter must pay for any increase in educational services. If a
voter has a house valued at $90,000, then exempting $30,000 or one-third of that value from taxation is
equivalent to cutting the voter’s “price” by one third. Just as people buy more coffee when the price of
coffee falls, voters vote for more educational services when the price of these services falls. According
to estimates by my EFAP colleague William Duncombe, Professor Tae Ho Eom of Rutgers University,
and me, a 1 percent drop in the price of educational services through STAR leads to about a 0.2 percent
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